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SUMMARY 26 
Growing concern about the biodiversity crisis has led to a proliferation of conservation 27 
responses, but with wide variation between countries in the levels of engagement and 28 
investment. Much of this variation is inevitably attributed to differences between nations in 29 
wealth. However, the relationship between environmentalism and wealth is complex, and it is 30 
increasingly apparent that other factors are also involved. We review hypotheses that have 31 
been developed to explain variation in broad environmentalism and show that many of the 32 
factors that explain such variation in individuals, such as wealth, age and experience, also 33 
explain differences between nation states. We then assess the extent to which these factors 34 
explain variation between nation states in responses to, and investment in, the more specific 35 
area of biodiversity conservation.  Unexpectedly, quality of governance explained 36 
substantially more variation in public and state investment in biodiversity conservation than 37 
did direct measures of wealth. The results inform assessments of where conservation 38 
investments might most profitably be directed in the future and suggest that metrics relating 39 
to governance might be of considerable use in conservation planning. 40 
 41 
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 44 
INTRODUCTION 45 
It is axiomatic that concern for, and investment in, biodiversity conservation varies greatly 46 
both between individuals and between countries, yet the reasons for this variation remain 47 
elusive. The current biodiversity crisis has united the world’s nations in attempts, thus far 48 
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with mixed success, to address it (Butchart et al. 2010). It is apparent that the response to the 49 
problem is occurring at different rates in different countries and that simple economics are 50 
not the sole determinant of this variation. For example, richer countries spend more on 51 
conservation but have less biodiversity (McClanahan & Rankin 2016) and national-level 52 
success in protecting threatened species is largely unrelated to wealth (Rodrigues et al. 2014). 53 
National conservation effort varies by region (Lindsey et al. 2017) and protected area cover 54 
appears to depend mainly upon an interaction between democratic strength and inequality 55 
(Kashwan 2017). A greater understanding of this variation in state-level responses to 56 
biodiversity conservation might help identify means to increase the prevalence of positive 57 
conservation efforts (and thereby contribute to Aichi Target 1 of the Convention on 58 
Biological Diversity Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020; CBD 2010) as well as being 59 
useful in conservation planning (Eklund et al. 2011; Lindsey et al. 2017).  60 
Although we are not aware of any single overriding theory to explain national-level 61 
variation in conservation responses, numerous hypotheses have been proposed to account for 62 
the adoption of more general concerns for the environment and pro-environmental behaviour 63 
(environmentalism), both between individuals and between states (Table 1). The underlying 64 
metrics of such analyses are usually factors such as energy use, recycling, responses to 65 
pollution, willingness to pay or aesthetic appreciation for nature or ‘biospheric’ values 66 
towards the environment (Steg & Vlek 2009; Raymond & Kenter 2016). Although there is 67 
much overlap, the literature examining individual-level variation in environmentalism 68 
focuses on personal characteristics and psychological variables such as attitudes, beliefs, 69 
values, and norms (Schwartz 1992; Dietz et al. 2005; Schultz et al. 2005; Heberlein 2012). In 70 
contrast, national-level variation is usually explained by macro-level socioeconomic drivers 71 
(Pisano & Lubell 2017). As the focus of this study is on national responses to conservation, 72 
we review these socioeconomic theories and use them as the basis of our analysis. 73 
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 74 
The roots of environmentalism  75 
At least three (not mutually exclusive) theories have been proposed to explain the 76 
development of broad environmentalism in terms of economic growth. Inglehart (1995; 2000) 77 
proposed that environmental concerns and corresponding environmental behaviours are the 78 
results of post-materialistic values that are likely to be more prevalent in wealthier nations: 79 
once a certain level of economic security is met individuals become free to develop post-80 
materialistic values, which include support for movements such as feminism, human rights, 81 
animal welfare and environmentalism (Duroy 2008). The post-materialist hypothesis receives 82 
empirical support from a number of studies that find a positive relationship between 83 
environmentalism and post-materialist values (Abramson 1997; Kidd & Lee 1997). However, 84 
this link has been challenged (Dietz et al. 2005). For instance, Davis (2000) found no 85 
difference between post-materialists and materialists in their perceived personal effort at 86 
conservation or general ecological concerns, while Fairbrother (2013) suggested that 87 
environmental concerns are highest in poorer nations. Inglehart (1995) also acknowledged 88 
that environmental concerns persist in poorer nations, but suggested that citizens of poorer 89 
countries develop environmental concerns over local issues that directly affect them, whereas 90 
in wealthy nations environmental concern is more to likely arise as an indirect consequence 91 
of affluence.  92 
The prosperity hypothesis (Diekmann & Franzen 1999) predicts that environmental 93 
concern increases with economic development as a direct consequence of greater income, and 94 
not due to the development of new values. This hypothesis is based upon standard economic 95 
theory, which reasons that the restoration of a damaged environment is not only a collective 96 
good but also a superior good, for which demand rises with income (Franzen & Meyer 2010). 97 
Consequently, there should be a positive correlation between a country’s wealth and its level 98 
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of environmental responsibility. This is supported by evidence that pro-environmental views 99 
and willingness to pay for environmental protection increases with wealth both within and 100 
between countries (Kemmelmeier et al. 2002; Franzen 2003; Franzen & Meyer 2010). 101 
Both the post-materialism and prosperity hypotheses are also used to support the 102 
environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis, which proposes that whilst environmental 103 
degradation initially rises with increasing income per capita, degradation levels stabilise 104 
before reducing at higher income (Grossman & Krueger 1995; Dinda 2004). An 105 
environmental Kuznets curve has been identified for some environmental metrics like 106 
energy-use, emissions and water quality (Luzzati & Orsini 2009; Orubu & Omotor 2011; 107 
Apergis & Ozturk 2015), but has been contested as an empirical illusion (Stern 2004), and 108 
fails to appear in other studies with the same or other environmental indicators (Koop & Tole 109 
1999; Kijima et al. 2010; Ozturk & Al-Mulali 2015) including those related to conservation 110 
(Dietz & Adger 2003; Mills & Waite 2009).  111 
All economic explanations of environmentalism face the inherent contradiction that 112 
while concern for the environment may increase with greater wealth, so too does 113 
environmental destruction, since economic development has been identified as one of the 114 
strongest correlates of biodiversity loss (Dietz et al. 2007; Bradshaw et al. 2010). 115 
Furthermore, these affluence-based hypotheses have been challenged by Dunlap and Mertig 116 
(1997) and Dunlap and York (2008), whose globalisation hypothesis posits that 117 
environmental concerns are no longer confined to post-materialistic elites within wealthy 118 
nations, and that there is no clear correlation between wealth and environmental concern.  119 
 120 
Although none can be entirely divorced from economics, numerous other socioeconomic 121 
patterns have been proposed to explain environmentalism, both between and within nations 122 
(Table 1). Pinker (2011) argues that long-term declines in human violence can be linked to a 123 
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number of ‘civilising’ historical and social trends, such as the development of the modern 124 
nation state and its associated judiciary, the empowerment of women and advances in 125 
education. Closely following the trend of declining violence against humans, Pinker argues, 126 
is a decline in violence against animals and, perhaps in the longer term, this extends to a 127 
decline in violence against the environment. Pinker’s ideas overlap with the principles of 128 
world polity theory – which highlights the global cultural diffusion of accepted institutional 129 
structures and modes of thinking (Shandra 2007; Givens & Jorgenson 2013), and how 130 
international organisations such as the UN fund and support domestic environmentalism as 131 
part of a ‘world environmental regime’ (Longhofer & Schofer 2010). World polity theory 132 
might explain why even countries with negligible interest in environmental matters generally 133 
have a government department charged with overseeing such issues.  134 
A nation’s linkage to world society is a strong predictor of the number of international 135 
environmental treaties it has ratified (Frank 1999), and levels of environmental concern 136 
(Longhofer & Schofer 2010). Global institutionalization of the principle that nations bear 137 
responsibility for environmental protection may be more influential in driving national 138 
conservation agendas than the domestic processes of increasing affluence or environmental 139 
degradation (Frank et al. 2000). Both Pinker’s civilising process and world polity theory 140 
require significant time over which to evolve, perhaps explaining why the age, or perceived 141 
age, of a country is positively correlated with environmentalism (Hershfield et al. 2014).  142 
 143 
Developing an over-arching theory may be problematic given that other historical (Grove 144 
1996; Adams et al. 2004), political (Heath & Gifford, 2006; Sapiains et al. 2016) and 145 
religious traditions (White 1967; Hand & Van Liere 1984) also shape environmental concerns 146 
and values both within and between countries (Manfredo et al. 2016). Moreover, the direction 147 
of predictors of environmentalism can vary across countries with different income levels 148 
7 
 
(Nawrotzki 2012), or within countries over time (Kahn 2002; Franzen & Vogl 2013), and it 149 
appears that environmental concern does not always predict pro-environmental behaviour 150 
(Shultz et al. 2005; Steg & Vlek 2009; Heberlein 2012; Everard et. al 2016). 151 
 152 
We assess the performance of these key hypotheses, developed to explain the variation in 153 
broad environmentalism, in explaining country-level variation in the more specific area of 154 
biodiversity conservation. While the drivers of variation in responses to biodiversity and 155 
wildlife have been explored in local contexts (Johansson et al. 2013; Kansky et al. 2014), and 156 
predictors of broad environmentalism have been assessed at a multi-national level (Gelissen 157 
2007; Givens and Jorgenson 2013; Nawrotzki 2012; Harring 2013; Hershfield et al. 2014), 158 
studies of conservation responses at the national level are sparse. To our knowledge the only 159 
conservation-specific response metrics that have been considered on a national level are 160 
biodiversity loss (Shandra et al. 2009; Butchart et al. 2010; Rodrigues et al. 2014), domestic 161 
conservation spending (McClanahan & Rankin 2016), protected area cover (Kashwan 2017), 162 
and a composite of these three metrics specifically with regards to megafauna conservation 163 
(Lindsey et al. 2017). As previous studies of environmental behaviours show that different 164 
metrics respond to different socioeconomic drivers and influences (Hadler & Haller 2011), 165 
we consider multiple metrics of conservation responses. Specifically, we aim to further the 166 
understanding of the variation in country-level conservation efforts, by assessing together 167 
additional and previously unconsidered metrics of national level conservation responses 168 
alongside explanatory socioeconomic variables used in previous studies to predict variation 169 
between nations in broad environmentalism (Table 1).  170 
 171 
 <Table 1.> 172 
 173 
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Methods 174 
We collected socioeconomic and historical data for each of the world’s nation states and 175 
used these in a multivariate regression analysis to model a number of variables related to 176 
national-level conservation responses or performance. Details of the response and 177 
explanatory variables selected, their sources, and the specific hypotheses they were selected 178 
to test are given in Table 2. All analyses were conducted in R 3.0.1 (R Development Core 179 
Team 2014); model selection was implemented using the package ‘MuMIn’ (Bartoń 2012). 180 
We modelled seven country-level response variables: per capita membership of 181 
environmental NGOs, the number of IUCN organisations operating in the country, the extent 182 
to which the Aichi Biodiversity Target 11 to protect biomes has been met, an index of 183 
ecosystem vitality, governmental spend on domestic conservation, governmental adoption of 184 
multilateral environmental agreements and the enforcement of environmental regulations. 185 
These variables were selected because they include independent metrics that relate to a range 186 
of public and national responses to the biodiversity crisis, which have previously not been 187 
considered together in similar analyses. Additionally, data were available for each variable 188 
for a sufficiently large number of countries (over 90) to allow multivariate modelling. The 189 
seven response variables were not strongly intercorrelated (Table S1). Based on previous 190 
studies of variation between nations in broad environmentalism, and the hypotheses already 191 
reviewed (Table 1), we initially considered seven explanatory variables: gross domestic 192 
product (GDP), per capita GDP (adjusted for purchasing power parity, PPP), country age, the 193 
level of globalisation, quality of governance, level of human development and degree of post-194 
materialism (Table 2). The Human Development Index was highly correlated with both per 195 
capita GDP and globalisation (r > 0.8, Table S2) and therefore excluded, as data were 196 
available for fewer countries. The small sample size (n = 76 countries) of the only available 197 
multinational metric of post-materialism meant that including this variable in analyses would 198 
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reduce statistical power. Thus we assessed two sets of models: one fitting the five 199 
explanatory variables with large sample sizes (GDP, per capita GDP, country age, 200 
globalisation and governance), and the other with these five variables plus post-materialism. 201 
We included linear and quadratic terms of GDP and per capita GDP, to assess evidence of 202 
Environmental Kuznets Curves (Grossman & Krueger 1995). We also tested interaction 203 
terms between (i) GDP and governance and (ii) per capita GDP and governance. 204 
We used generalised linear models (GLMs) to model each response variable as a function 205 
of the two sets of explanatory variables. We standardised all explanatory variables to 206 
compare the effect size among explanatory variables, and normalised GDP, per capita GDP 207 
and country age using log10-transformation. Because NGO membership and the number of 208 
IUCN organisations are likely to vary with population size, and because we could not model 209 
per capita values of these because per capita GDP was included as a predictor (thus meaning 210 
that population size would appear on both sides of the regression equation, causing spurious 211 
correlations), the population size of each nation was also included as a predictor in these 212 
models to control for its effect, though we do not report its result. Statistical distributions 213 
assumed in the GLMs were based on the type of the response variables: normal for log10-214 
transformed NGO membership; ecosystem vitality and environmental enforcement; negative 215 
binomial for the IUCN organisations; binomial for Aichi Target 11 progress and multilateral 216 
agreements; and Gamma for square root-transformed domestic conservation spending. We 217 
adopted a model selection approach (Burnham & Anderson 2002). We generated a set of 218 
models with all possible parameter subsets, which were then fitted to the data using the 219 
GLMs and ranked by ΔQAICc (the difference between each model’s QAICc and QAICcmin, 220 
that of the “best” model) for binomial GLMs to deal with overdispersion and ΔAICc for 221 
others. We report the top 10 models or all models with ΔAICc or ΔQAICc values < 2 for 222 
each analysis. To investigate the effect of spatial autocorrelation, we calculated Moran’s I for 223 
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the residuals from the full models, using the package ‘ncf’ (Bjørnstad 2005) in R. The 224 
calculated Moran’s I was small (|Moran’s I| < 0.3) up to the first 14, 000 km in all the 225 
databases, indicating no more than a weak autocorrelation. Thus, we did not consider spatial 226 
autocorrelation explicitly in the models. 227 
Considering the relatively strong positive correlations between governance, per capita 228 
GDP and globalisation (r = 0.71 – 0.77, Table S2), we also adopted a variation partitioning 229 
approach (Borcard et al. 1992) to assess the unique and shared contributions of these three 230 
explanatory variables to explaining between-nation variation in conservation responses. We 231 
used R2 for GLMs assuming normal distribution (NGO membership, ecosystem vitality and 232 
environmental enforcement) and McFadden’s pseudo-R2 for others, and excluded the 233 
quadratic and interaction terms of per capita GDP. 234 
 235 
<Table 2.> 236 
 237 
Results 238 
Model selection yielded strong support for an effect of governance in explaining variation in 239 
almost all the response variables modelled. Governance was the only explanatory variable 240 
that was included in all models of all response variables with ΔAICc or ΔQAICc values < 2 241 
(Table S3). The response variables all showed a strong positive association with governance 242 
(Fig. 1a). The results also identified GDP as a significant predictor, as it was included in 243 
more than half the models with ΔAICc or ΔQAICc values < 2, including the best models of 244 
six response variables (Table S3, Fig. 1b).  245 
<Fig. 1> 246 
The same key role of governance was found in the models that included a measure of post-247 
materialism, except in the case of the number of IUCN organisations (Table S4).  Post-248 
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materialism itself failed to explain significant variation in any of the response variables 249 
(Table S4). We did not find clear evidence of an environmental Kuznets curve for any of our 250 
conservation response variables besides ecosystem vitality, for which there was a weak 251 
indication of an environmental Kuznets curve. 252 
The variation partitioning showed that the unique contribution of governance was higher 253 
than that of per capita GDP and globalisation in accounting for variation in four of the seven 254 
response variables. However, for all but one response variable the variation was best 255 
explained by the three variables (governance, per capita GDP and globalisation) combined, 256 
rather than any one of them alone (Fig. 2). 257 
<Fig 2.>  258 
 259 
Discussion  260 
Our analyses yielded equivocal support for the largely economic hypotheses that have been 261 
developed to explain variation in broad environmentalism. GDP received support in models 262 
of only some response variables – including for conservation spending, mirroring the results 263 
of McClanahan & Rankin (2016). Post-materialism failed to explain variation in any of the 264 
variables modelled. Globalisation also failed to garner much support from the data as being a 265 
useful predictor.  Country age was the best predictor of the number of IUCN organisations 266 
within a country, which lends support to the observation by Herschfield et al. (2014) that 267 
country age is a predictor of public environmental concern. However, country age was a poor 268 
predictor of other conservation metrics, and effective environmental organization may not 269 
necessarily reflect underlying public environmental concern (Longhofer & Schofer 2010). 270 
Instead, governance was found to be the best predictor across almost all variables, suggesting 271 
that world polity theory and Pinker’s ‘civilising process’ might be useful frameworks with 272 
which to explore further the between-nation variation in conservation responses and 273 
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performance. The extent to which governance was a better predictor of responses to 274 
biodiversity conservation than was economic wealth was unexpected, and cannot be 275 
explained by covariance between governance, per capita GDP and globalisation, since 276 
variation partitioning revealed that in four out of the seven response variables, the 277 
independent contribution of governance in explaining variation in response variables was far 278 
greater than that of the other two variables. Governance has been shown to be an important 279 
predictor of biodiversity loss (Smith et al. 2003), deforestation rates (Wright et al. 2007, 280 
Umemiya et al. 2010), protected area effectiveness (Barnes et al. 2016) and poaching (Burn 281 
et al. 2011), but as far as we are aware, ours is the first analysis to suggest that governance 282 
outperforms more purely economic variables in explaining a range of metrics of conservation 283 
effort and investment across most of the world’s nations. 284 
 285 
Although the causal links between governance and biodiversity conservation remain unclear, 286 
there are several plausible mechanisms. The relationship between biodiversity and corruption 287 
is complex and poorly understood (Barrett et al. 2006; Smith & Walpole 2005), but 288 
willingness to make economic sacrifices for environmental protection appears to be strongly 289 
affected by individual political trust (Harring 2013). The over-centralisation typical of 290 
countries with lower governance scores may inhibit local conservation actions (Zheng & Cao 291 
2015; Everard 2015), and in these states conservation policy may not be supported by the 292 
development of legal standards and procedures (Otto et al. 2011). Effective governance might 293 
promote the growth of agricultural yields while minimising the spread of uncontrolled, 294 
particularly damaging agriculture (Ceddia et al. 2014). Internal strife and conflict, the rates of 295 
which are explicitly captured in governance statistics, have generally negative impacts on 296 
biodiversity (Dudley et al. 2002). On a local scale, better governance may increase the 297 
strength of local institutions and improve common-pool resource management, particularly 298 
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where property rights are lacking (Ostrom et al. 2007). Likewise, less effective governance 299 
undermines sustainable harvest (Nelson et al. 2013; Schuhbauer & Sumaila 2016) and 300 
incentive-based conservation (Ebeling & Yasué 2009; Duchelle et al. 2014). Finally, 301 
improved quality of governance may be associated with greater engagement with 302 
international conservation agreements. For example, European countries must achieve an 303 
acceptable level of governance before they can accede to the European Union, upon which 304 
they are bound to strict conservation legislation that has been shown to be successful (Donald 305 
et al. 2007); although such legislation is not always enforced (López-Bao et al. 2015). 306 
Democracies perform better than other systems of government in joining and implementing 307 
international conservation agreements and in protecting land for wildlife (Neumayer 2002a). 308 
 309 
Our finding that globalisation correlates with some conservation responses (multilateral 310 
agreements and ecosystem vitality) corroborates Neumayer (2002b), who found a positive 311 
association between trade openness and the ratification of multilateral environmental 312 
agreements. However, the absence of a relationship between globalisation and our other 313 
response variables suggests that economic, social and political connectivity alone does not 314 
increase conservation efforts. Instead, if conservation responses have spread around the 315 
globe, it might be down to the influence of specific actors, such as international 316 
environmental organisations (Shandra et al. 2009; Givens & Jorgenson 2013). Given the 317 
significance of governance identified here, the influence of world polity on conservation may 318 
also have occurred indirectly via the building of conservation capacity through democratic 319 
institutions and governance systems (Dunlap & York 2008). This link is supported by the 320 
finding that international nongovernmental organizations help reduce deforestation, and do so 321 
increasingly at higher levels of democracy (Shandra 2007). 322 
 323 
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Conservation responses may also be influenced by other forms of capacity however. 324 
Environmental organisation for example, appears to depend heavily the availability of 325 
financial resources, the concentration of individuals in populated urban areas (Gillham 2008) 326 
and levels of education and awareness (Brady, Verba, & Schlozman 1995; Duroy 2008). 327 
These factors, which we did not specifically test here, might also account for why the number 328 
of IUCN organisations did not correlate with governance as strongly as our other response 329 
variables. Furthermore, all these factors identified which occur at the national-level, may 330 
overshadow the influence of post-materialist values at the individual level (Kemmelmeier et 331 
al. 2002), thus perhaps explaining why we fail to find an effect of post-materialism here. 332 
Alternatively, this might be because conservation problems have both materialist and 333 
nonmaterialist dimensions in both rich and poor nations (Martinez-Alier & Guha 1997; 334 
Dunlap & York 2008). Indeed, the range of conservation motivations is reflected in the many 335 
types of (materialist and nonmaterialist) ecosystem services identified across all societies 336 
(Crossman et al. 2013; Raymond & Kenter 2016). Moreover, given that post-materialist 337 
values and resulting environmental behaviours are supposed to be the product of prosperity 338 
(Inglehart 1995; 2000) the lack of a clear relationship between our conservation responses 339 
and per capita wealth refutes the post-materialism hypothesis.  340 
 341 
We also find no evidence for an environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) for conservation 342 
responses. Ecosystem vitality was the only variable that shows a relationship resembling a 343 
weak EKC, but this effect may be down to the indices of water pollution and air quality 344 
which make up the majority of ecosystem vitality index (Morse 2017), and which have 345 
previously been found to follow the EKC, rather than biodiversity. Along with economic 346 
growth driving increasing environmental concern and demand, a key tenant of the EKC, is 347 
that technological progress eventually reduces environmental degradation. However 348 
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technological progress has not yet produced similar results for conservation, owing to slow 349 
speciation rates (Dietz & Adger 2003), competitive exclusion of nonhuman species and 350 
challenges involved in habitat restoration (Czech 2008), which might explain the lack of an 351 
EKC for biodiversity metrics. Indeed, wealth appears only to start reducing biodiversity loss 352 
once a minimal level of institutional quality has been achieved (Gren et al. 2016); again, 353 
emphasising the significance of governance in determining conservation outcomes. However, 354 
our other responses, which relate more to conservation concern and effort, also showed no 355 
EKC relationship. This finding suggest that conservation efforts will not readily reduce as 356 
poorer nations develop, and that greater wealth does not necessarily inspire greater 357 
conservation efforts, despite that richer people may be more willing to pay for conservation 358 
(Jacobsen & Hanley 2009; Franzen & Meyer 2010). Lastly, again departing from an EKC, 359 
some poorer nations may prioritize conservation for economic reasons (such as ecotourism), 360 
and unlike other forms of environmental degradation, the direct links between biodiversity 361 
loss and human well-being (Díaz et al. 2006) may be appreciated differently by citizens and 362 
policy makers across the world.   363 
 364 
We did not identify inequality as being one of the key hypothesized drivers of 365 
environmentalism (hence we did not account for it in our analysis), but inequality may also 366 
influence conservation responses. Environmental performance of nations appears to increase 367 
with equality (Morse 2017) but protected area cover also depends on the strength of 368 
democracy (Kashwan 2017). In countries with strong democracies, low inequality is 369 
associated with higher protected area cover, but in weak democracies higher inequality is 370 
associated with greater protected area cover (Kashwan 2017); possibly because establishing 371 
conservation areas may be easier in areas of weaker property rights, greater power associated 372 
with elites (including environmental organisations) (Sandbrook 2017) and limited civic 373 
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ability to contest (Kashwan 2017). This result challenges our findings by demonstrating that 374 
some conservation responses can proliferate under less-effective governance. However, 375 
protected area cover also associates with remoteness (Joppa & Pfaff 2009) and tourism 376 
attractiveness (Baldi et al. 2017), suggesting a degree of strategic planning or opportunism 377 
which deserves greater exploration. Besides, the size of protected area coverage is not 378 
necessarily indicative of its quality (De Santo 2013), instead local governance seems to be a 379 
key driver of conservation and social outcomes (Oldekop et al. 2016).  380 
 381 
Wealthier countries tend on average to have higher levels of governance, but there is a 382 
sufficient number of wealthy countries with less-effective governance, and poor countries 383 
with effective governance, to justify treating governance as an informative metric in its own 384 
right, and not simply a surrogate of wealth. Given the importance of governance in explaining 385 
countries’ conservation responses and investment, this provides important insights into future 386 
changes in global conservation activities. Many countries in biodiversity-rich regions, such as 387 
South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America & Caribbean, now have rapidly growing 388 
economies, posing serious threats to biodiversity there (Bradshaw et al. 2010). However, 389 
governance in these regions is generally low (Fig. 3), suggesting that their levels of positive 390 
conservation responses and investment are unlikely to increase in the near future. This 391 
suggests a further challenge to achieving the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, which aim to 392 
improve the status of biodiversity and enhance the implementation of effective biodiversity 393 
strategies and action plans by 2020 (CBD 2010).  394 
 395 
<Fig. 3> 396 
 397 
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Nonetheless, governance is dynamic, and can change within countries over time (Inglehart & 398 
Welzel 2005). Whilst the potential for improved governance is encouraging for conservation, 399 
periods of instability and armed conflict can easily threaten biodiversity (Loucks et al. 2008; 400 
Brashares et al. 2014), and even in wealthy, well-governed states, environmental regulations 401 
can readily be disregarded, diminished, discarded (López-Bao et al. 2015; Chapron et al. 402 
2017). Wealthy well-governed states may also appear to superficially improve their 403 
conservation performance by transferring the ecological footprint of their consumption and 404 
industry to poorer, less-well governed nations in ‘unequal ecological exchange’ (Jorgenson 405 
2016). Scrutinizing such patterns further and improving the transparency of trans-national 406 
supply chains would help tackle this problem. The nature of conservation governance is also 407 
subject to change (Agrawal et al. 2008; Duffy 2014); with sometimes unintended negative 408 
consequences, such as perverse incentives (Gordon et al. 2015), or stakeholder resentment 409 
(Bennet & Dearden 2014). Existing local governance structures can also outperform 410 
centralized state regimes (such as protected areas) in some places (Schleicher et al. 2017). 411 
These effects should be appreciated when considering new forms of environmental 412 
governance, including digital crypto-governance, which has been tipped to improve 413 
environmental record keeping and reduce corruption with blockchain technology (Chapron 414 
2017). The digital world is also increasingly offering new ways for individuals to engage 415 
with conservation online; presenting opportunities for increased participation (Baynham-Herd 416 
2017) but also new challenges, including for conservation governance (Büscher 2017). 417 
 418 
We suggest that metrics relating to governance might also be of considerable use in 419 
conservation planning. Like economic costs (Naidoo et al. 2006), governance scores could be 420 
used for assessing where conservation investments and capacity building would most 421 
profitably be directed and for determining the types of conservation action (capacity 422 
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development or practical delivery) that are most likely to bear fruit (Eklund et al. 2011; 423 
Garnett et al. 2011). Indeed, there is evidence that international aid for biodiversity 424 
conservation is already being targeted at recipient countries that have higher levels of 425 
governance (Miller et al. 2013). Wider recognition of the link between governance and 426 
conservation may encourage greater collaboration between conservation interests and those 427 
working to promote better governance. Environmental NGOs have already contributed to this 428 
process, and have helped construct a world polity that speeds the transfer of conservation as a 429 
universal principle between nations (Boli & Thomas 1997; Longhofer & Schofer 2010; 430 
Givens & Jorgenson 2013). At the local level, working to improve conservation governance 431 
might also prove more productive than trying to generate shifts in conservation values 432 
(Manfredo et al. 2017). Lastly, we suggest our findings should promote further scrutiny to the 433 
notion that through economic growth alone we will escape from this environmental crisis. 434 
There is more to conservation than markets: governance must be considered alongside 435 
growth. 436 
 437 
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Legends: 762 
 763 
Table 1. Some socioeconomic and societal correlates of broad environmentalism identified at 764 
national and individual levels. Numbers in parentheses in the first column link to those listed 765 
after the names of the explanatory variables in Table 2 to indicate which factor each 766 
explanatory variable was selected to represent in the models. 767 
 768 
Table 2. Descriptions and sources of the response and explanatory variables used in the 769 
analyses. For the explanatory variables, the numbers in parentheses after the variable name link 770 
to those given in Table S1 to indicate which factor previously shown to predict broad 771 
environmentalism each was chosen to test. Small or non-independent polities (e.g. San Marino, 772 
Gibraltar), and recently created states that are included in the CIA World Factbook 773 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) but for which many variables 774 
were missing (e.g. South Sudan, Somaliland), were removed from the analysis (n = 14). 775 
 776 
Figure 1. Relationships between seven response variables reflecting conservation concerns 777 
and (a) governance, (b) gross domestic product (GDP), (c) per capita GDP, (d) country age 778 
and (e) globalisation. Lines represent regression lines based on the estimated coefficients in 779 
the best models (Table S3). Lines are not shown for variables not included in the best models. 780 
The y-axes differ between response variables. 781 
Figure 2. Results of variation partitioning for (a) NGO membership, (b) IUCN organisations, 782 
(c) % Aichi target achieved, (d) ecosystem vitality, (e) domestic conservation spending, (f) 783 
multilateral agreements and (g) environmental enforcements, in terms of fractions of 784 
variation explained independently and jointly by governance, per capita GDP and 785 
globalisation. 786 
 787 
Figure 3. The global distribution of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 788 
(WGI; 2013 values). 789 
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Table 1. 797 
Factor Relationship with 
environmentalism 
National (across 
countries) 
Individual (within 
country) 
Wealth (1) Variable, generally 
positive 
GDP or rate of 
economic 
development 
(Gelissen 2007; 
Givens and Jorgenson 
2011) 
 
Personal wealth 
relative to the national 
average (Franzen and 
Vogl 2013; Gelissen 
2007) but see Dunlap 
and York (2008) 
Trust (2) Positive Governance (Harring 
2013) 
Interpersonal trust 
(Franzen and Vogl 
2013; Meyer and 
Liebe 2010) 
Post-materialism 
(3) 
Positive Post-materialism 
(Gelissen 2007) 
Post-materialist 
values (Franzen and 
Vogl 2013; Gelissen 
2007; Gifford and 
Nilsson 2014) but see 
Davis (2000) 
Awareness (4) Positive Media coverage of 
environmental issues 
(Harring et al. 2011); 
national levels of 
education (Ignatow 
2006) 
Individual levels of 
education (Clements 
2012; Franzen and 
Vogl 2013; Gelissen 
2007; Gifford and 
Nilsson 2014) 
Autonomy/Maturity 
(5) 
Positive Years since 
independence 
(Hershfield et al. 
2014); autonomy, self 
expression (Dobewall 
and Strack 2014) 
Sense of control, age, 
political engagement 
(Clements 2012; 
Gelissen 2007; 
Gifford and Nilsson 
2014) 
Integration (6) Positive Integration with world 
polity (Boli and 
Thomas 1997; Frank 
et al. 2000; Givens 
and Jorgenson 2013); 
perceived country age 
Sense of control; 
responsibility (Gifford 
& Nilsson 2014); 
civic cooperation 
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(Hershfield et al. 
2014) 
(Owen and Videras 
2006) 
Environmental 
experience  
Positive Level of 
environmental 
degradation (Givens 
and Jorgenson 2011) 
Childhood exposure 
to the environment;  
proximity to 
environmental 
problems (Gifford & 
Nilsson 2014)  
Religious or 
political stance 
 
Variable  Religion (Hand & Van 
Liere 1984); Political 
system (Nawrotzki 
2012) 
Religion (Clements 
2012; Wolkomir et al. 
1997; Manfredo et al. 
2016); Politics 
(Sapiains et al. 2016) 
 798 
 799 
 800 
 801 
 802 
 803 
 804 
 805 
 806 
 807 
 808 
 809 
 810 
 811 
 812 
 813 
 814 
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Table 2. 815 
Variable name Description and source 
Response variables 
NGO 
  membership 
The membership of the national partner of BirdLife International. The use of 
environmental association as a metric for civic environmentalism follows Dalton 
(2005) and Longhofer & Schofer (2010).  
IUCN 
  organisations 
The number of IUCN organisations, taken from the IUCN Members’ Database 
https://www.iucn.org/about/union/members/who_members/members_database/. 
The use of environmental NGO presence as a measure of environmental concern 
follows Smith & Wiest (2005) and Givens & Jorgenson (2013). 
% Aichi target 
  11 achieved 
The extent (measured as a percentage) to which each country has met Aichi 
Biodiversity Target 11 of the Convention on Biological Diversity for protecting 
17% of each biome at a national level (Convention on Biological Diversity 2010). 
One of the indices that comprises the wider Ecosystem Vitality Index, which in 
turn combines with a number of metrics on human health and wellbeing to 
comprise the Environmental Performance Index (http://epi.yale.edu/epi). We 
consider this a more comprehensive metric of biodiversity protection than simply 
% protected area cover (e.g., Kashwan 2017).  
Ecosystem 
  vitality 
A composite of the previous index with further indices on ecosystem protection 
and indices on water, agriculture, forests, fisheries, climate and energy. This 
represents an index of broader ecosystem and biodiversity-influencing issues than 
the previous index (http://epi.yale.edu/epi) 
Domestic 
  conservation 
  spending 
Domestic conservation spending in million US$, taken from Waldron et al. 
(2013), following Vincent et al. (2014) and (McClanham & Rankin 2016) 
 
Multilateral 
  agreements 
 
The number of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) signed, from a set 
of 25. Examples include the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES). Data are taken from the Environmental-sustainability adjusted GCI 
(2013-2014 edition). The use of multilateral agreements as a national-level 
environmental response follows Neumayer (2002b).   
Environmental 
  enforcement 
Enforcement of environmental regulations. This score is a component in the 
Environmental-sustainability adjusted GCI (2013-2014 edition).  It is obtained 
from the World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey, 2011 and 2012 
editions. Scores are within-country averages of assessments of enforcement from 
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1= very lax to 7= among the world’s most rigorous. Following Dasgupta et al. 
(2001) and Rivera & Oh (2013). 
 
Explanatory variables 
GDP (1) Gross domestic product in US$, 2013 estimates (World Bank). Linear and 
quadratic terms included. 
Per capita GDP 
  (1) 
Per capita GDP in US$ corrected for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), 2013 
estimates (World Bank; 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD). For the small 
number of countries without estimates, the uncorrected per capita GDP was 
entered to maintain sample sizes. Linear and quadratic terms were included. 
Country age (5) Age of country as given in CIA World Factbook 
Globalisation 
  (4,6) 
KOF Index of Globalisation (Dreher 2006), 2012 values. This index measures a 
country’s level of economic, social and political globalisation and includes data 
on economic flows and restrictions, information flow and cultural proximity. 
Governance 
  (2,5,6) 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank). These indicators score 
countries on six measures of governance: voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
rule of law and control of corruption. Each measure is scaled in the same way; we 
used the 2012 average across all six measures. http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators 
Development 
  (1,4) 
Human Development Index (United Nations Development Programme). A 
composite statistic of life expectancy, education and income indices. 
Post-materialism 
  (3) 
From the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Because of the small 
sample size, this variable was tested in a separate set of analyses (Table S4). 
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Table S1. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between response variables. 
 NGO 
membership 
IUCN 
organisations 
% Aichi target 
11 achieved 
Ecosystem 
vitality 
Domestic 
conservation spend 
Multilateral 
agreements 
   
   
 
IUCN organisations 0.41  
   
 
% Aichi target 11 
achieved 
0.24 0.27 
   
 
Ecosystem vitality 0.52 0.35 0.57 
  
 
Domestic conservation 
spending 
0.77 0.57 0.26 0.63 
 
 
Multilateral agreements 0.48 0.33 0.23 0.50 0.48  
Environmental 
enforcement 
0.65 0.29 0.33 0.60 0.64 0.45 
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Table S2. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between explanatory variables. Values larger than 0.8 are shown in bold. 
 
 
Population 
size 
Country 
age 
GDP Per capita GDP Globalisation Governance Development 
Population size 
       
Country age 0.44 
      
GDP 0.73 0.51 
     
Per capita GDP -0.08 0.21 0.57 
    
Globalisation 0.09 0.29 0.62 0.77 
   
Governance -0.28 0.14 0.23 0.72 0.71 
  
Development -0.07 0.20 0.56 0.94 0.82 0.78 
 
Post-materialism 0.02 0.55 0.34 0.43 0.43 0.52 0.49 
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Table S3. Model selection tables (post-materialism excluded; see text) for each of the seven dependent variables listed in Table 2. Regression 
coefficients are given for each explanatory variable for each of the ten most highly ranked models (or for all models with ΔAIC<2). Explanatory 
variables (see Table 2 for further details): I intercept, Gov governance, GDP Gross Domestic Product, GDPpc per capita GDP, Age country age, 
Glob globalisation. 
 
% Aichi target 11 achieved I Gov GDP GDP
2 GDP*Gov GDPpc GDPpc2 GDPpc*Gov Age Glob QAICc Δ 
 
 
0.361 0.439                 188.737 0 
 
 
0.364 0.411             0.14   189.554 0.817 
 
 
0.253 0.445         0.111       189.806 1.069 
 
 
0.441 0.465   -0.079             190.12 1.384 
 
 
0.363 0.41 0.098               190.216 1.48 
 
 
0.263 0.418         0.105   0.134   190.759 2.023 
 
 
0.361 0.459       -0.028         190.803 2.067 
 
 
0.361 0.426               0.018 190.823 2.087 
 
 
0.446 0.436   -0.081         0.141   190.932 2.195 
 
 
0.334 0.474   -0.09     0.123       191.019 2.283 
 
              Ecosystem Vitality I Gov GDP GDP
2 GDP*Gov GDPpc GDPpc2 GDPpc*Gov Age Glob AICc Δ 
 
 
39.562 4.242 2.978       1.526     6.232 1329.2 0 
 
 
39.14 3.374 2.476     2.084 1.95     5.657 1329.395 0.195 
 
 
39.194 2.929 2.063   1.356 2.555 1.447     5.366 1329.952 0.752 
 
 
40.556 4.15 2.599   1.588         5.807 1329.965 0.765 
 
 
40.391 3.259 1.994   2.087 2.031       5.133 1330.291 1.091 
 
 
39.664 4.072 2.773   0.924   1.117     6.121 1330.572 1.372 
 
 
39.976 4.615 3.128 -0.438     1.548     5.856 1330.965 1.765 
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41.079 4.611 2.928             5.796 1330.97 1.77 
 
 
41.226 4.732 2.805 -0.763 1.855         5.145 1330.995 1.795 
 
 
41.101 3.842 2.187 -0.816 2.394 2.12       4.394 1331.172 1.972 
 
 
39.885 4.712 3.455 2.225 1.353 -0.706 2.599 1.669       1.988 
 
 
39.528 4.328 3.171   1.56       -0.388 6.159   1.996 
 
              Environmental enforcement I Gov GDP GDP
2 GDP*Gov GDPpc GDPpc2 GDPpc*Gov Age Glob AICc Δ 
 
 
3.671 0.765 0.118     -0.033   0.201     193.498 0 
 
 
3.589 0.716   0.069   0.083   0.22     193.914 0.416 
 
 
3.62 0.75 0.098 0.056   -0.007   0.196     193.961 0.462 
 
 
3.664 0.816 0.121     0.032   0.21   -0.125 194.286 0.787 
 
 
3.648 0.727       0.073   0.233     194.565 1.067 
 
 
3.624 0.791 0.104 0.046   0.038   0.204   -0.095 195.45 1.952 
 
 
3.641 0.774       0.137   0.242   -0.118 195.496 1.998 
 
 
3.662 0.768 0.119     -0.024 0.027 0.178     195.57 2.071 
 
 
3.591 0.749   0.062   0.125   0.228   -0.08 195.612 2.113 
 
 
3.669 0.767 0.124     -0.036   0.204 -0.012   195.708 2.21 
 
              Multilateral agreements I Gov GDP GDP
2 GDP*Gov GDPpc GDPpc2 GDPpc*Gov Age Glob QAICc Δ 
 
 
1.336 0.379 0.146   -0.219 -0.273   0.173   0.256 386.756 0 
 
 
1.413 0.428 0.182   -0.116 -0.379       0.276 387.027 0.271 
 
 
1.365 0.363 0.179     -0.312       0.261 387.521 0.765 
 
 
1.437 0.41 0.194 -0.072   -0.331       0.222 387.631 0.875 
 
 
1.45 0.445 0.191 -0.048 -0.088 -0.376       0.246 388.536 1.78 
 
 
1.378 0.415 0.174   -0.146 -0.346 0.049     0.285 388.67 1.914 
 
 
1.453 0.523 0.212 -0.092   -0.248         388.756 2 
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1.363 0.392 0.155 -0.028 -0.194 -0.279   0.159   0.239 388.848 2.092 
 
 
1.34 0.374 0.131   -0.226 -0.266   0.173 0.031 0.26 388.86 2.104 
 
 
1.317 0.487 0.155   -0.225 -0.148   0.198     389.052 2.295 
 
              
NGO membership I Gov GDP GDP
2 GDP*Gov GDPpc GDPpc2 GDPpc*Gov Age Glob log10Pop AICc Δ 
 
2.797 0.399 0.564 0.171   -0.02   0.182       172.831 0 
 
2.775 0.297 0.532 0.195   -0.079   0.18   0.193   172.984 0.154 
 
2.807 0.376 0.512 0.169   -0.003   0.172 0.095     173.546 0.716 
 
2.785 0.27 0.477 0.193   -0.062   0.17 0.098 0.198   173.603 0.773 
 
2.755 0.308   0.201   0.217   0.198 0.115 0.212 0.4 174.562 1.731 
 
2.856 0.392 0.513 0.172     0.081   0.114     174.571 1.74 
 
2.844 0.408 0.573 0.175     0.09         174.659 1.829 
 
2.74 0.344   0.204   0.235   0.214   0.21 0.453 174.687 1.856 
 
2.817 0.256 0.469 0.196     0.097   0.121 0.187   174.76 1.93 
 
2.777 0.424   0.176   0.303   0.203 0.114   0.431 174.844 2.014 
              Domestic conservation spend I Gov GDP GDP
2 GDP*Gov GDPpc GDPpc2 GDPpc*Gov Age Glob AICc Δ 
 
 
0.921 0.558 0.83               400.191 0 
 
 
0.877 0.546 0.824 0.043             401.959 1.769 
 
 
0.92 0.551 0.804           0.054   402.045 1.854 
 
 
0.883 0.554 0.836       0.038       402.163 1.972 
 
 
0.921 0.592 0.852     -0.056         402.25 2.059 
 
 
0.921 0.585 0.847             -0.044 402.324 2.133 
 
 
0.918 0.556 0.827   0.009           402.387 2.196 
 
 
0.877 0.539 0.798 0.043         0.054   403.86 3.669 
 
 
0.883 0.547 0.811       0.037   0.052   404.079 3.888 
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0.854 0.543 0.83 0.038     0.029       404.09 3.899 
 
              
IUCN organisations I Gov GDP GDP
2 GDP*Gov GDPpc GDPpc2 GDPpc*Gov Age Glob log10Pop AICc Δ 
 
1.576 0.239 0.876   0.203 -0.642 -0.215   0.241     921.627 0 
 
1.523 0.261 -0.155   0.255   -0.179   0.26   0.851 921.685 0.058 
 
1.568 0.182 0.849   0.191 -0.697 -0.212   0.242 0.152   922.53 0.903 
 
1.552 0.269 0.355   0.228 -0.34 -0.203   0.249   0.439 922.689 1.062 
 
1.512 0.211 -0.247   0.248   -0.173   0.262 0.13 0.908 922.923 1.296 
 
1.597 0.269 0.883   0.241 -0.662 -0.167 -0.116 0.243     922.997 1.37 
 
1.494 0.26 -0.172 0.038 0.236   -0.177   0.265   0.851 923.465 1.839 
 
1.544 0.212 0.322   0.216 -0.391 -0.199   0.25 0.153 0.444 923.584 1.958 
 
1.592 0.211 0.854   0.233 -0.725 -0.156 -0.135 0.244 0.168   923.637 2.011 
 
1.561 0.237 0.867 0.019 0.194 -0.64 -0.214   0.244     923.741 2.114 
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Table S4. Model selection tables (post-materialism included; see text) for each of the seven dependent variables listed in Table 2. Regression 
coefficients are given for each explanatory variable for each of the ten most highly ranked models (or for all models with ΔAIC<2). Explanatory 
variables (see Table 2 for further details): I intercept, Gov governance, GDP Gross Domestic Product, GDPpc per capita GDP, Age country age, 
Glob globalisation, Postmat post-materialism. 
 
 
       
 
  
    % Aichi target 11 achieved I Gov GDP GDP
2 GDP*Gov GDPpc GDPpc2 GDPpc*Gov Age Glob Postmat QAICc Δ 
 
 
0.315 0.367             0.292     79.93 0 
 
 
0.309 0.472                   79.944 0.014 
 
 
0.309 0.683       -0.299           80.656 0.726 
 
 
0.315 0.562       -0.271     0.277     80.995 1.065 
 
 
0.312               0.344 0.285   81.182 1.252 
 
 
0.307               0.435     81.224 1.294 
 
 
0.197 0.348   0.123         0.316     81.618 1.689 
 
 
0.217 0.476         0.095         81.641 1.712 
 
 
0.225 0.368         0.094   0.294     81.726 1.797 
 
 
0.226 0.464   0.084               81.876 1.946 
 
               Ecosystem Vitality I Gov GDP GDP
2 GDP*Gov GDPpc GDPpc2 GDPpc*Gov Age Glob Postmat AICc Δ 
 
 
46.021 6.576               5.539   552.756 0 
 
 
44.233 4.693       2.056   2.599   5.11   554.184 1.428 
 
 
45.293 6.026         0.738     6.191   554.365 1.61 
 
 
46.021 6.058               5.531 0.855 554.694 1.938 
 
 
46.021 6.414 0.696             5.404   554.737 1.982 
 
 
46.021 6.399       0.943       4.977   554.76 2.005 
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46.021 6.407             0.385 5.562   554.958 2.202 
 
 
46.022 6.577   -0.001           5.539   555.058 2.303 
 
 
45.403 5.741 0.638   1.566         5.832   555.719 2.963 
 
 
44.993 5.487       1.665 1.042     5.467   555.916 3.16 
 
               Environmental enforcement I Gov GDP GDP
2 GDP*Gov GDPpc GDPpc2 GDPpc*Gov Age Glob Postmat AICc Δ 
 
 
3.776 0.928 0.191     -0.129   0.203       108.577 0 
 
 
3.772 1.033 0.17     -0.056   0.208   -0.181   109.12 0.543 
 
 
3.769 0.924 0.193   -0.065 -0.121   0.244       110.568 1.991 
 
 
3.772 0.945 0.208     -0.141   0.208 -0.037     110.852 2.275 
 
 
3.797 0.934 0.195 -0.024   -0.137   0.206       110.915 2.338 
 
 
3.771 0.934 0.193     -0.125   0.21     -0.018 111.054 2.477 
 
 
3.774 0.93 0.192     -0.128 0.008 0.195       111.083 2.507 
 
 
3.764 1.03 0.171   -0.069 -0.047   0.252   -0.184   111.115 2.538 
 
 
3.811 1.066 0.17       0.119     -0.197   111.336 2.759 
 
 
3.792 0.899 0.176       0.138         111.386 2.809 
 
               Multilateral agreements I Gov GDP GDP
2 GDP*Gov GDPpc GDPpc2 GDPpc*Gov Age Glob Postmat QAICc Δ 
 
 
1.501 0.46 -0.007   -0.369 0.021 -0.225 0.488       253.976 0 
 
 
1.58 0.494 0.008 -0.086 -0.299 -0.02 -0.216 0.453       255 1.024 
 
 
1.505 0.387 0.012   -0.368 -0.031 -0.213 0.468   0.127   255.873 1.897 
 
 
1.507 0.438 -0.028   -0.366 0.034 -0.232 0.488 0.044     256.384 2.408 
 
 
1.507 0.451 -0.009   -0.368 0.017 -0.222 0.477     0.025 256.63 2.654 
 
 
1.585 0.421 0.028 -0.087 -0.295 -0.073 -0.204 0.431   0.129   256.968 2.992 
 
 
1.66 0.509   -0.15   -0.075 -0.233 0.284       257.095 3.119 
 
 
1.579 0.496 0.009 -0.086 -0.299 -0.02 -0.216 0.455     -0.005 257.799 3.823 
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1.58 0.495 0.009 -0.086 -0.299 -0.021 -0.215 0.453 -0.002     257.801 3.825 
 
 
1.511 0.367 -0.008   -0.364 -0.017 -0.221 0.467 0.043 0.126   258.389 4.413 
 
               
NGO membership I Gov GDP GDP
2 GDP*Gov GDPpc GDPpc2 GDPpc*Gov Age Glob log10Pop Postmat AICc Δ 
 
3.203 0.16 0.616   0.262         0.297     97.294 0 
 
3.204 0.251 0.4   0.259         0.359 0.218   98.21 0.916 
 
3.213 0.197 0.659   0.241 -0.159       0.369     98.411 1.117 
 
3.218 0.411 0.626   0.229               98.744 1.45 
 
3.184   0.652 0.146           0.428     99.42 2.127 
 
3.204 0.155 0.599   0.26       0.038 0.291     99.801 2.507 
 
3.188 0.146 0.617 0.027 0.237         0.311     99.843 2.55 
 
3.205 0.144 0.612   0.257         0.297   0.029 99.871 2.577 
 
3.195 0.152 0.622   0.253   0.012     0.306     99.918 2.624 
 
3.154 0.156 0.665   0.182 -0.114   0.119   0.372     100.2 2.906 
               Domestic conservation spend I Gov GDP GDP
2 GDP*Gov GDPpc GDPpc2 GDPpc*Gov Age Glob Postmat AICc Δ 
 
 
1.603 0.581 0.733                 237.796 0 
 
 
1.491 0.575 0.748 0.105               238.597 0.801 
 
 
1.596 0.718 0.847     -0.236           238.973 1.177 
 
 
1.505 0.54 0.799       0.094         239.283 1.486 
 
 
1.601 0.552 0.705           0.08     239.877 2.081 
 
 
1.601 0.639 0.741               -0.092 239.93 2.134 
 
 
1.575 0.556 0.742   0.075             239.993 2.196 
 
 
1.757 0.879 0.852     -0.323   -0.219       240.237 2.44 
 
 
1.603 0.611 0.742             -0.04   240.275 2.479 
 
 
1.475 0.538 0.71 0.117         0.107     240.421 2.625 
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IUCN organisations I Gov GDP GDP
2 GDP*Gov GDPpc GDPpc2 GDPpc*Gov Age Glob log10Pop Postmat AICc Δ 
 
1.898     0.177         0.415 0.332 0.543   463.131 0 
 
1.936   0.719 0.125   -0.623     0.346 0.41     463.136 0.005 
 
2.061   0.803     -0.705     0.309 0.459     463.27 0.139 
 
1.98 0.072 0.774   0.181 -0.688     0.269 0.361     464.485 1.354 
 
1.933 0.293   0.145         0.43   0.524   464.505 1.374 
 
2.058 0.166 0.789     -0.738     0.3 0.349     464.847 1.716 
 
1.902     0.168   -0.123     0.414 0.435 0.552   464.893 1.762 
 
2.059   1.318     -1.052     0.279 0.419 -0.429   464.966 1.835 
 
1.911 0.108   0.162         0.401 0.243 0.548   465.198 2.067 
 
2.08 0.349             0.385   0.586   465.305 2.174 
 
 
